The Threat Assessment 2018 compiled by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) is one of four threat assessments and risk analyses and is published annually. The other three are published by the Intelligence Service, the National Security Authority and the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning.

The main task of the [Intelligence Service](https://www.ses.no) is to supply information and assessments on foreign, security and defence policy matters. The Service publishes an annual assessment on conditions in other countries that could threaten Norway and Norwegian interests. This year’s assessment, Focus 2018, provides an overview of situations and security threats in different countries and regions together with the nature of the threats. The assessment has a time frame of one year.

The [National Security Authority](https://www.het.no) is the Norwegian expert body on information and object security and the national centre of expertise on IT security. The Authority publishes an annual assessment on security matters within the scope of application of security legislation. It includes an assessment of the risk that individuals, critical national functions and infrastructure, or sensitive and classified information will be subject to espionage, sabotage, acts of terrorism or other serious incidents. The assessment has a time frame of one year.

The [Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning](https://www.ksmsj.no) maintains an overview of risk and vulnerability factors in Norwegian society. The Directorate has published scenario analyses since 2011. The analyses are concerned with the risk of disasters that could affect Norwegian society, so that society’s emergency preparedness and response systems are equipped to meet them. The scenarios include natural disasters, major accidents and deliberate acts. These analyses have a longer time frame than the annual assessments of the other three agencies.

In 2018, the threat situation in Norway is characterised by a number of complex challenges. The security policy development and its effects on close allies and adjacent areas will significantly mark the threat situation. Moreover, a number of European countries are facing serious terrorist threats. These threats will influence European counter terrorist work in the year ahead.

In this threat assessment, we describe the most likely developments of the threat situation in 2018. We focus on the threat actors as well as on the methods they use. The assessment is primarily intended for those in Norwegian society who seek public information about expected developments of the threat picture. The assessment is also intended for companies that need an updated threat assessment as part of their risk management. However, it is essential that the users of the threat assessment are well acquainted with their own values and make their own assessments of the best way to secure them. If you suspect that you have been exposed to a situation as mentioned in this assessment, please notify us so we can assess whether a follow-up is required.
SUMMARY

State intelligence activity

- The most serious challenges posed by foreign states’ intelligence activities in 2018 will be their recruitment of sources and agents, mapping of companies and critical infrastructure, as well as network operations.

- The Norwegian defence and public security sector, public administration, research and development and critical infrastructure are assessed to be particularly at risk of becoming intelligence targets.

Politically motivated violence

- Individuals and groups inspired by an extreme Islamist ideology still represent the most significant terrorist threat to Norway in the year ahead. There may be attempts to carry out terrorist attacks.

- A terrorist attack or an attempted attack is most likely not very complex, probably carried out by one or two individuals, who use pointed weapons or firearms, vehicles or simple explosive devices.

- We consider it unlikely that right-wing extremists will carry out a terrorist attack in Norway in 2018. If a right-wing terrorist incident should occur, an individual or a small group of people, operating on their own initiative, would probably be responsible.

- This last year, we have seen an increase in the activity in some parts of the left-wing extremist milieu. Left-wing extremists are, however, highly unlikely to carry out terrorist acts.

Threats against dignitaries

- Some politicians will receive threats and hateful statements because of the political issues they face. Most threat actors, however, have a high threshold for committing violence, and we do not expect this to change in 2018.
Companies involved in the Norwegian defence and public security sector, public administration, research and development and critical infrastructure are assessed to be particularly at risk of becoming targeted. Many countries' intelligence services are interested in the mentioned fields and may carry out acts that could harm our interests. Russian intelligence activity is still believed to have the most significant damage potential. In addition, services of other states, for instance Chinese, may carry out unwanted and harmful activity.

In order to get access to assets in the most targeted enterprises, the intelligence services will use a number of different methods. In 2018, we expect that attempts to recruit individuals as sources and agents will continue to be made, and that Norwegian enterprises will become subject to mapping and network attacks. Moreover, attempts will be made to influence and undermine decision-making processes, and Norwegian enterprises will be subject to attempts of illegal procurement of knowledge and technology.

Foreign intelligence services will in the year ahead try to recruit individuals in Norway with access to valuable information. Recruitment of sources and agents is an essential task for any intelligence service. Many countries' intelligence services have personnel stationed in Norway, who have such recruitment as their main task.
These services aim at recruiting insiders with direct access to valuable information. However, a service can also recruit individuals with a large network of contacts, who only have indirect access to relevant information. In such cases, employees in an enterprise may pass on information to an agent without realising that they are being controlled by an intelligence service. It is very difficult to uncover such activity on your own. An indication of such activity, which employees in targeted enterprises could take note of, is when a colleague, contact or acquaintance requests sensitive information that is not part of this individual’s usual tasks.

Insiders will often be the intelligence services’ best access to Norwegian information worth protecting. This could for instance be political and economic strategies, technology and research, registers and sensitive personal data, banks and the finance sector as well as information about Norwegian defence, the public security sector and critical infrastructure.

When recruiting sources and agents, the intelligence officers start by trying to establish a personal and friendly relationship with individuals within the enterprises. The officer will then usually have a cover position, which provides an excuse that makes it natural to get in contact. We see that intelligence officers often use open seminars and conferences on topics such as security policy, High North policy, technology and innovation, as arenas to establish such contact. We expect these arenas to remain relevant also in 2018.

Later in the recruitment process, the intelligence officer prefers communicating in private. By means of different cultivation efforts, the officer may try to make his target feel he owes him a debt of gratitude, which the officer can take advantage of in the subsequent recruitment. The intelligence officer could for instance make apparently innocent requests to test the target’s willingness to cooperate. If the intelligence officer starts offering economic compensation, one could be in the process of developing a relationship with the intelligence officer that it could be difficult to get out of.

Intelligence services have far more freedom of action to recruit Norwegians who live abroad. Norwegians staying in countries with authoritarian regimes, where the security and intelligence services have a strong and dominant position, are particularly at risk. In such countries, the services may monitor and search the residence, hotel room, luggage and electronic devices, on the lookout for information or situations suited for exploitation. Moreover, it is possible for the services to arrange compromising situations, which subsequently could be used to put pressure on someone to cooperate.

Several countries’ security and intelligence services also have the power and authority to put a considerable pressure on their own citizens who work in Norway. PST knows about several cases where individuals, who either prior to moving here or when visiting their home country later, have been subject to attempts to pressure them into spying for their home country. In some countries, individuals as well as enterprises, organisations and government institutions are obliged to cooperate with the country’s intelligence services.

NETWORK OPERATIONS

Much of the intelligence activity aimed at Norway and Norwegian interests takes place in the digital arena. PST is witnessing a steady occurrence of network operations from actors representing foreign states. In 2018, we expect these actors to continue their operations against targets in Norway. This will particularly affect enterprises within the defence and public security sector, public administration, research and development and critical infrastructure.

A network operation usually starts by a threat actor making a reconnaissance of the entity of interest. The intruder will identify employees on social media, in job networks, collect e-mail addresses, thereby getting an understanding of the fields and problems in which the entity is engaged. The threat actor will also identify the technical specifications of the target’s computer systems. Such information is necessary for the actor to identify which weaknesses to exploit to be able to penetrate the system.
Depending on the nature of the weaknesses, there are several ways to introduce malware. Most of these methods are well known, and the threat actors take advantage of known vulnerabilities in the networks. Threat actors can also introduce malware via mobile storage media, such as memory sticks or CDs. However, the most common way of covertly accessing a network is via targeted e-mails, so-called spear-phishing. By using e-mail, the threat actor can usually hide behind an apparently legitimate sender address and adjust the content to the recipient’s field of work or area of interest. The malware itself is hidden in enclosures or links in the e-mail.

If the malware functions properly, the intruders will try to install «backdoors» to provide a permanent access to the network. If the malware functions properly, the intruders will try to install «backdoors» to provide a permanent access to the network. We have also seen several examples of threat actors procuring administrator rights to be able to get access to new parts of the infected computer network. In 2017, an operation of this kind against a Norwegian enterprise handling sensitive information and technology was revealed. In most of the computer network operations we have seen, the intruders are interested in collecting information from the enterprises. However, we have also internationally seen examples of threat actors who have the ability and will to both manipulate information and sabotage digital systems.

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MAPPING

Norwegian entities are methodically exposed to different types of mapping. This activity will continue in 2018. Personnel from foreign countries’ services will film, take photos, make technical measurements, and intercept Norwegian enterprises and infrastructure. The mapping also includes efforts to collect personal data about individuals in our country. Such identification provides advance knowledge that could be used to disturb and weaken Norwegian defence and preparedness ability in future emergencies. This activity has a considerable damage potential.

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Norway’s security policy anchored in NATO, combined with the proximity to the Russian Northern Fleet, make Norwegian territory and waters consequential. The intelligence threat, especially against matters relating to defence, security and preparedness will thus continue. Intelligence actors operating towards Norway under cover of travelling, business activity and tourism will identify military installations, communication lines, energy supplies and other critical infrastructure. In 2017, several drones were observed close to Norwegian military exercises, installations and equipment. The possibility of getting close to such intelligence targets, with a small risk of being revealed, makes drones an attractive intelligence tool.

Mapping of exile milieus and individuals in Norway is often caused by other countries’ need for an overview and control of potential political opponents. However, such identification could also be part of a process aimed at threatening, pressuring and eliminating political opposition. Exile milieus from conflict areas and countries with authoritarian regimes are particularly at risk of being identified.

A number of organisations and individuals in Norway engage in issues involving internal matters in other countries. Whereas Western societies see debates and possible criticism as part of the open debate within a democracy, some states and their regimes may find such a discussion threatening. Mapping of those who appear to be ideological and political opponents, will thus also in 2018 continue to be a specific task for the intelligence services of such countries.

INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Several countries’ intelligence services have designated resources to influence political processes. These resources may also be aimed at Norwegian decision-makers and those who set the terms for the discussion of key issues. In 2018, different methods will be used to plan or carry out influence operations in Norway. Intelligence officers working under cover may contact Norwegian politicians, researchers, journalists and ministry staff. Their aim is to establish channels for covert influence. We also expect services from certain countries to try to influence the debate and decisions in concrete cases. This could be done by means of directed information operations, via social media or deliberate leakages to Norwegian or international media.
Through operations of this kind, a foreign state can take advantage of and strengthen already existing discontent or disagreement. The aim could be to make people mistrust public statements and media, thus weakening their confidence in the authorities and their legitimacy. Foreign states may also generate discord and polarisation in individual cases, to support their own interests. If Norwegian decision-makers’ opinions are influenced or changed as a result of covert information operations, this will first and foremost imply a weakening of our ability to protect national interests. Over time, operations aimed at causing conflicts and political polarisation, could impair the confidence in political processes and undermine our ability to make good decisions and handle crises.

**PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY**

Export of goods and technology for weapons of mass destruction is strictly regulated by the export control regulations. Norwegian industry includes suppliers of military high technology as well as smaller suppliers of niche technology. Within this whole area, there are enterprises of interest to countries with a programme for weapons of mass destruction. Producers, developers, sub-suppliers and intermediaries involved in Norwegian defence and technology industry are likely to be subject to attempts of illegal procurement for use in different weapons programmes in 2018.

Several states are currently strengthening their military capacity by rearming and modernising their armed forces. For some, this implies investing in national programmes for weapons of mass destruction. In order to run these programmes, the states need to procure goods and technology from various suppliers in a number of countries, including Norwegian suppliers.

This year, Norwegian companies should be vigilant towards procurement attempts from countries such as Pakistan and Iran. We expect Pakistan to be the main actor behind illegal and covert procurements aimed at Norwegian companies in 2018. These companies should also direct their attention towards countries that have a nuclear weapons programme, but do not comply with international agreements in this area. This particularly applies to North Korea.

Some countries request defence-related goods and technology as well as civilian technology with a military use. This includes the demand for goods and technology with quite advanced specifications that are not included in the list of goods under the export control regulations. In this context, Norwegian companies should be particularly vigilant when exporting for instance composite materials, control technology, advanced production, testing and measuring equipment, submarine technology and fibre optics.

We also expect that countries we are concerned about will request information within areas of technology that can be used for advanced weapons development or development of weapons of mass destruction. These countries have a long-term horizon for their procurement strategy. They see the benefit of recruiting or planting students and researchers in Norwegian higher education and research institutions, who could later become involved in their own country’s weapons programme.

A number of different international actors are involved in covert procurements. These are often organised in a network of front companies and intermediaries to conceal the real actors behind the procurements. The actors within these networks are often insistently in their contact with Norwegian technology companies. They may request uncommon freight routes, extraordinary packaging or unusual terms of payment.

Export-controlled goods that are located abroad could be stolen by procurement networks, for instance during transport or installation. We therefore urge companies to have good routines for securing and being in control of such goods abroad.

We have seen from experience that exporters often could have revealed illegal procurements, if they had been more attentive to indications of unusual activity. Companies should be aware that in some countries, the connection between the private industry, the government and the military is very tight. This means that export of goods and technology to the private industry could imply a risk of transfer to the military authorities of these countries.
Extreme Islamists continue to represent the most significant terrorist threat to Norway. The milieus nevertheless seem to have weakened somewhat compared to a few years ago. Furthermore, an increased level of activity among certain right-wing extremist milieus will pose a challenge in 2018. It is, however, very unlikely that right-wing extremist groups will commit terrorist acts.

**THREAT SITUATION**

The threat from extreme Islamists in Norway involves potential planning of attacks in addition to radicalisation\(^2\), recruitment and financing of terrorism. Through their propaganda, terrorist organisations such as ISIL and al-Qaida, present their aim of attacking the West by terrorist acts. Initiations to sympathisers in the West of carrying out attacks by simple means at their current location could also mobilise extreme Islamists in Norway. We therefore assess it as possible that extreme Islamists may attempt to commit a terrorist attack in the course of 2018. This implies that Norwegian public and private enterprises have to take into account that a terrorist act could be attempted. A terrorist attack or an attempted attack will most likely not be very complex, and will probably be carried out by one or two individuals using pointed weapons or firearms, vehicles or simple explosive devices.

The threat from right-wing extremists primarily comes from mobilisation and recruitment to the Nordic Resistance Movement. The long-term strategy of this milieu is to establish a national socialist state by means of organisational development and radicalisation. Despite the fact that right-wing extremist organisations so far have not encouraged anybody to commit

\(^2\) By radicalisation, we understand «a process whereby an individual gradually accepts or develops a will to actively support or take part in violent acts as a means of achieving political, religious or ideological aims». 
terrorist acts in Norway, we are nevertheless concerned that certain right-wing extremists may take action on their own. Individuals in the periphery of established extreme networks could for different reasons choose to carry out a serious violent act. Nevertheless, we assess it as unlikely that right-wing extremist groups will try to carry out a terrorist act in Norway in 2018.

The threat from other extreme milieus is low. It is highly unlikely that left-wing extremists or anti-state milieus will try to carry out a terrorist act in Norway. The growth of right-wing extremist milieus could this year contribute to mobilising left-wing extreme groups and individuals.

EXTREME ISLAMISM

THE ENEMY IMAGE LIVES ON

The terrorist organisation ISIL has lost its central position in Syria and Iraq and main parts of its territory. Despite this, ISIL's enemy image and propaganda live on, not least in the West. ISIL will adjust its agenda to this new situation and maintains its message to sympathisers in the West of attacking targets in Western countries oppressing Muslims and being at war with Islam. Norway's position in the enemy image held by these individuals varies. For some sympathisers of ISIL and al-Qaida, Norway is included in the general enemy image and a legitimate target for terrorist attacks. These individuals may be inspired by the attacks that have been carried out in Europe, and by ISIL’s and al-Qaida’s propaganda messages, instigating individuals to carry out attacks where they are.

There are different reasons and motives why individuals end up in extremist milieus. The enemy image of extreme Islamists may be coloured by personal motives and ideological convictions. Many have a background characterised by crime, drugs, mental challenges and often a low level of education, and unemployment. The fact that they are frustrated with their own life conditions could make them more receptive to hate propaganda and glorification of violence. At the same time, they become included in a milieu that gives them an identity, a sense of belonging and a strong fellowship. This could make them move the boundaries for what they perceive as necessary and legitimate use of violence.

Weakening milieus in Norway

The extreme Islamist milieus in Norway have declined, compared to the period from 2012 until 2015. This development is expected to continue in 2018. The decline manifests itself for instance by the fact that the milieu appears to be less organised than before. Moreover, extreme Islamists are far less visible to the general public. Public demonstrations and visible propaganda activity are practically non-existent. Key individuals have been imprisoned, and several have deceased during their stay in Syria and Iraq. Even though the organised extreme Islamist milieu in Norway is experiencing a period of decline, this may rapidly change. Indications of a potential growth of the Norwegian extreme Islamist milieu in 2018 would be the appearance of key leader figures, visible active extreme Islamists in public places, organised propaganda activity and demonstrations.

Furthermore, radicalisation into extreme Islamism in Norway probably occurs to a lesser extent than in the past. Today, usually individuals rather than organisations are involved in radicalisation. This implies for instance that the message of the extremists does not reach as many as before. We do not expect any significant changes of the radicalisation into extreme Islamist milieus in 2018.

However, incidents perceived as insulting to Islam or Muslims may occur without warning, and could have a rapid impact on the radicalisation. Radicalisation may also be going on without our knowledge. It is particularly challenging to reveal unorganised radicalisation activity and online radicalisation.

Radicalisers will continue to contact asylum centres and various religious arenas. Attempts at radicalisation will continue to be made in prisons across the country. In our opinion, a small number of inmates could enter into a radicalisation process while serving their sentence this year. We see from experience, however, that the genuineness of the ideological conviction of the prison-radicalised individuals varies, and that it is highly uncertain whether it will endure after they have served their sentence.

Compared to the period from 2012 until 2015, very few extreme Islamists want to or attempt to travel to Syria or Iraq today. As far as PST knows, there are on the short side of 40 Norwegian-affiliated foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq. These have limited possibilities of getting out of the conflict area. Even if they manage to leave Syria or Iraq, they do
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE

not necessarily want to return to Norway. Thus, it is assessed as unlikely that a large number of the Norway-related foreign fighters in the conflict area will return to our country in 2018. If individuals that have been staying in Syria or Iraq should return to Norway to re-establish contact with extreme Islamists here, this could have a negative effect on the threat.

INSPIRED ATTACKS ARE THE MOST LIKELY TYPE OF TERRORIST ATTACK

Inspired attacks are the dominant type of terrorist attack in Europe: one or more individuals take the initiative to carry out an attack. Attacks that are directly monitored by a terrorist organisation, or an individual acting on the direct orders of a terrorist organisation, rarely happen. Inspired attacks appear to be the most likely type of terrorist attack in Norway. Even if pointed weapons and vehicles are the most used means in terrorist attacks in Europe today, there are also attacks involving firearms and explosives. To which extent these means of attack are available to extreme Islamists and organised criminal milieus could affect the access to firearms and to some extent explosives. There are no indications that extreme Islamists will have easier access to weapons in Norway in 2018.

Lately there has been a clear increase in the number of completed attacks against general targets in the Western world. This trend is expected to continue in 2018. By general targets, we understand types of targets without any ideological meaning for extreme Islamists, apart from representing the West and being located there. Such targets are often large crowds of people in easily accessible public places. As opposed to general targets, symbolic targets may be linked, directly or indirectly, to ideological key issues. The police and army represent the most preferred symbolic targets for extreme Islamists. Certain extreme Islamists see these categories of targets as operative personnel, and they have a high symbolic value as representatives of Western authorities.

If a terrorist attack is carried out in Norway, it is unlikely to deviate from the type of attack we see elsewhere in Europe. This means that attacks by the use of knives or vehicles are relevant also in our country. The same applies to the choice of target. Places where many civilians are gathered and where there are few security measures are most at risk of becoming targeted. Furthermore, the most likely terrorist threat in Norway is posed by extreme Islamist terrorists operating alone or in pairs. We are unlikely to see an attack that is directly monitored by a terrorist organisation, or an attack involving many actors, in Norway.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 2018

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

A MORE DISTINCT ENEMY IMAGE

The development for 2018 goes in the direction of a more distinct enemy image among right-wing extremists, aimed at specific individuals and groups. In certain milieus, the rhetoric this last year has become tougher and more threatening. The enemy image held by traditional neo-Nazi milieus in Norway is especially concentrated on minority groups such as immigrants, Muslims, Jews and homosexuals. They are also preoccupied with race, and believe the Nordic race to be superior to other races and particularly threatened by Jews, Muslims and immigrants from a foreign culture. Different variants of conspiratorial theories form the basis for this enemy image, in which Norwegian authorities are accused of contributing to threatening the Nordic race and Norwegian culture.

One fraction of the right-wing extremist milieu primarily has Muslims in their enemy image. They also believe Norwegian culture and national identity to be threatened by immigration and the Islamic religion, but they are not as concerned about race as the traditional neo-Nazi milieus. Statements from these right-wing extremists are clearly more Islamophobic than before. This development coincides with the situation in other European countries, where criticism of Islam is central. Anti-Islamic views are particularly visible on Internet, but also at demonstrations and events.

INCREASED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WITHIN THE ORGANISED RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST MILIEU

Right-wing extremism in Norway is characterised by unorganised and loosely connected networks, with the exception of the Nordic Resistance Movement (DNM), which has become more organised. The group appears to be more visible in the public sphere and to have a clearer leadership. DNM’s primary aim is to ensure the organisational development and recruitment. We expect to see a continued effort to recruit more members. This will become visible in demonstrations and at public events.

DNM has close ties to the Swedish fraction and depends on its support to organise large demonstrations and develop the organisation further in Norway. The Swedish milieu has a larger capacity. This could inspire Norwegian fellow partisans and be a driving force for a negative development.
Because of a higher level of activity and a more noticeable presence, the opposition against the right-wing extremist groups is on the increase in Norway. This seems to have a unifying effect on the right-wing extremist milieu. DNM will use negative publicity in the media and a ban on demonstrations to strengthen internal solidarity and to recruit more people to the milieu. We expect this to continue also this year.

**THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM LONE ACTORS AND SMALLER GROUPS**

Right-wing extremist groups are unlikely to carry out terrorist acts in the year ahead. Organisational development and recruitment will continue to be their main objective. It is nevertheless challenging that many right-wing extremists have a broad interpretation of self-defence, which could lower their threshold for committing violence, for instance in connection with public demonstrations. The terrorist threat from right-wing extremists primarily comes from individuals and small groups in the periphery of the more established milieus. These individuals can take the initiative to carry out a violent act, at the same time as they legitimise the act on the basis of a general ideological and political conviction.

**OTHER EXTREMISM**

**INCREASED ACTIVITY IN LEFT-WING EXTREMIST MILIEUS**

Left-wing extremism is a marginal phenomenon in Norway. However, this last year we have seen an increased activity in parts of the milieu. The growing activity primarily concerns mapping and exposure of individuals who are fascinated by weapons. In 2017, Norwegian right-wing extremists were found to be in possession of legal and illegal weapons. Both legal and illegal weapons are likely to continue to be available for right-wing extremists in Norway in 2018.

In most of the incidents involving right-wing extremist violence in Europe, knives and unsophisticated types of weapons are used. Many of the incidents fall under the category of hate crime. As concerns right-wing extremist terrorist attacks, we see that explosives have been the preferred means of attack since 2012, followed by firearms and knives. At the turn of the year 2016-2017, Sweden was subjected to attacks committed by means of explosives. Two of the attacks were aimed at asylum and refugee centres. So far, we have no indications that the capacity of Norwegian right-wing extremist milieus has changed considerably, or that their capacity will increase in 2018.

**GROWING ANTI-STATE EXTREMISM**

The state and various public authorities are essential to the enemy image of individuals with anti-state convictions. A key element of this ideology is the view of the government as illegitimate. According to anti-state theories, the rules and regulations of the state violate the independence of the individual citizen.

Anti-state groups are on the increase, especially in some European countries. Today, they primarily represent a commonality of interest that shares experience and information on Internet and social media. The threat from anti-state extremists in Norway is low. However, individuals promoting anti-state theories have a violent potential. In certain situations, employees in various public services may be subject to use of violence, threats about violence and harassment from individuals with such convictions. It is, however, very unlikely that anti-state individuals will commit any politically motivated violent acts in 2018.
Certain high-profiled politicians nevertheless received a higher number of insulting comments and threatening statements on Internet and social media during the election campaign. We see, however, that some politicians, who are regarded as controversial by certain milieus in Norway, frequently receive threats and hateful statements based on the political issues they front.

Most threat actors have a low capacity and ability to inflict violence, and dignitaries are seldom subject to attacks or attempted attacks.

Individuals threatening the royal family often have mental problems and need a follow-up from the National Health Service. They very seldom pose any real threat of violence. We do not expect any changes in the use of violence against dignitaries in 2018.

Even though most threats are expressed on social media and very few dignitaries experience attacks or attempted attacks, the threat activity may nevertheless have extended effects. Two examinations of the threat activity against Norwegian dignitaries revealed that:

- Individuals with mental problems or personal motives are responsible for most of the threats against Norwegian dignitaries. The Parliamentary elections in 2017 took place without any serious incidents towards elected representatives.

- These last years, Internet and social media have become the main platforms for threat activity aimed at Norwegian dignitaries. The threshold for making threatening and insulting statements, especially towards politicians, appear to be lower. Personal motives and political discontent seem to be the main trigger factors for those who make threats on social media. Their frustration with their own life conditions or feeling of powerlessness when confronted with administrative decisions is often essential. Some publish threats on social media when they are intoxicated, without later acknowledging any real intention of inflicting any physical harm.
members of Parliament reveal that a threatening behaviour and insults on social media could influence their political work. They could become reluctant to front controversial points of view or political issues that may cause negative attention. Some also consider quitting as politicians.

Threat activity online will continue with unabated strength also in 2018, and could have negative consequences for Norwegian politicians’ freedom of speech and their political work.

DIGNITARIES IN THE ENEMY IMAGE OF EXTREME INDIVIDUALS OR MILIEUS

Extreme groups or individuals belonging to extreme milieus seldom threaten Norwegian dignitaries directly. We find, however, that certain extreme milieus nevertheless for periods of time have included specific dignitaries in their enemy image. This is often the case when controversial political questions touch upon core issues of these milieus, most often related to defence and foreign policy or justice and immigration policy.

PST’S CATEGORISATION OF PROBABILITY LEVELS

In our assessments of politically motivated violence and threats against dignitaries, we have devised a set of standardised terms to indicate estimated probability. The aim is to achieve a more uniform description of the probability level in each case and thereby reduce as much as possible any lack of clarity and risk of misunderstanding.

The following terms and definitions have been developed in a cooperation between the police, PST and the Norwegian Intelligence Service.

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<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>There is a very good reason to believe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>There is reason to believe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>There is little reason to believe</td>
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<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>There is very little reason to believe</td>
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THE NORWEGIAN POLICE SECURITY SERVICE
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